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Mindblindness: Three Nations Approach
the Special Case of the Criminally Accused
Individual with Asperger's Syndrome
Brian Wauhop*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine moving through life without the ability to comprehend that
other people possess different emotional states, cognitive experiences
and perceptions than you do. You have a compulsive need to create
routines that affect all aspects of your everyday life. You pursue narrow
interests, excluding other people and activities. While you communicate
the best you can, you always feel misunderstood by others, and you
always feel like you cannot understand what others mean when they
speak. Imagine the confusion you would experience when faced with the
constant reality that your own conduct, while appropriate from your
perspective, is often socially unacceptable to others. This is a rough
description of the social experience of an individual with Asperger's
Syndrome ("AS").'
AS is a pervasive developmental disorder 2 closely related to autistic
spectrum disorders.3 According to the Center for Disease Control, one
out of every 150 children has some form of autism. 4 While AS was first
studied and described over sixty years ago, only recently has the
* Juris Doctorate, Candidate, 2009, The Dickinson School of Law of the
Pennsylvania State University. I thank my wife and my parents for their unwavering
support, and the editors of the Penn State InternationalLaw Review for their insight and

feedback. I dedicate this article to my brother.
1.

See TONY ATrwoOD, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO ASPERGER'S SYNDROME 36, 37

(Jessica Kingsley Publishers 2006).
2. Id. at 350 (defining "pervasive developmental disorder" as "a severe impairment
in reciprocal social interaction skills and communication skills and the presence of
repetitive behavior, interests and activities").
3. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (text revision 2000) (DSM-IV-TR) (hereinafter DSMIV).
4. See Ranit Mishori, More Children Are Affected and Controversies Rage: What
Do We Know About Autism?, PARADE, Jan. 27, 2008, at 4.
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diagnosis gained widespread acceptance.5 Current estimates put the
prevalence rate of AS possibly as high as one in 250 individuals (.4
percent of the population).6 AS individuals experience difficulties
coping with everyday life and society and frequently require lifelong
coaching. 7 The social impairment appears to continue into adulthood. 8
Research suggests that AS sufferers are no more likely to commit crime
than neurotypical 9 individuals.10
However, studies reveal the prevalence rate of AS individuals in
prison populations is much higher, ranging between 1.5 percent and 2.4
percent. 1' This overrepresentation suggests that AS individuals are
This
slipping through the cracks in criminal prosecutions. 12
overrepresentation suggest that an AS individual might be convicted and
incarcerated because of the peculiar manifestation of their disorder rather
than on any legally culpable conduct. 13 With a potential prevalence rate
of one in 250,14 the disorder has implications for criminal law systems
throughout the world.
The following discussion will analyze how criminal law systems in
the United States, England, and Australia currently deal with the
criminally accused AS individual. Courts in each of these nations have
decided cases wherein criminal defendants have raised the diagnosis of
AS in their defense. AS and the legal significance of its characteristic
traits, including mindblindness, will be explained, followed by a brief
history of criminal culpability requirements. Next, an analysis of recent
English, United States and Australian cases will explore the current legal
landscape for the AS criminal offender. The discussion will conclude by
suggesting potential reforms in criminal law in order to improve the AS
offender's access to justice.

5.

See ArrwooD, supra note 1, at 14.

6. Id. at 46.
7. Id. at 57-92.
8.

See Ami Klin, Autism and Asperger Syndrome: An Overview, 28 REV. BRAS.

PSIQUIATR. S3, S1O (2006) (noting that many AS children are able to attend regular
education classes with additional support, but the social impairment appears to be
lifelong).
9. "Neurotypical" describes people whose neurological development and current
neurological state allow for what most people would agree is the "normal" ability to
process social cues and language. See Jim Sinclair, A Note About Language and
Abbreviations, http://web.syr.edu/-jisincla/language.htm (last visited Feb. 11, 2008).
10. See ATrWOOD, supra note 1, at 335.
11. See Barbara G. Haskins, M.D. & J. Arturo Silva, M.D., Asperger's Disorderand
Criminal Behavior: Forensic-PsychiatricConsiderations, 34 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCH. L.
374, 377, 382 (2006).
12. See generally id.
13. See Haskins & Silva, supra note 11, at 378.
14. See ATrWOOD, supra note 1, at 46.
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ASPERGER'S SYNDROME

Asperger's Syndrome was first described by Austrian psychiatrist
Dr. Hans Asperger in 1944.15 Dr. Asperger studied four children who
16
were otherwise intelligent but had difficulty with social interactions.
He called the condition "autistic psychopathy" to indicate a stable
personality disorder marked by social isolation. 17 Dr. Asperger's
research was published primarily within German literature, 18 and while
his original descriptions of the condition were very clear, he did not
articulate diagnostic criteria for the disorder.' 9
As a result, widespread application of Dr. Asperger's research was
delayed until 1981 when British psychiatrist Dr. Lorna Wing published a
review of Dr. Asperger's work. 20 The title of Wing's article popularized
the term "Asperger's syndrome., 2 That article spurred interest in Dr.
Asperger's work, and new studies on the disorder began.22
A.

DiagnosticCriteria

Gillberg and Gillberg 23 published the first diagnostic criteria
("Gillberg criteria") for AS in 1989, and later revised it in 1991. The
criteria identified six traits that must be present in a child to warrant a
diagnosis of AS: 1) social impairment; 2) narrow interest; 3) compulsive
need for introducing routines and activities; 4) speech and language
peculiarities; 5) non-verbal communication problems; and, 6) motor
clumsiness. 24 Within each trait, one or more of a list of specific
25
characteristics must be present to establish that trait.
By the mid-90s, AS was starting to become recognized as a
legitimate disorder among global health organizations.2 6 In 1993, the
15. See Hans Asperger, 'Autistic Psychopathy' In Childhood, in UTA FRITH, AUTISM
AND ASPERGER SYNDROME 37-62 (Cambridge University Press 1992).

16.

See Klin, supra note 8, at S8.

17. Id.
18. See generally Loma Wing, Asperger's Syndrome: A ClinicalAccount, 11 PSYCH.
MED. 115 (1981).

19.

See ATTWOOD, supra note 1, at 36.

20. See Nachum Katz & Zvi Zemishlany, Criminal Responsibility in Asperger's
Syndrome, 43 ISRAEL J. PSYCH. & RELATED SCI. 166, 166 (2006).
21. See Wing, supra note 18, at 115.

22.
23.

See Katz & Zemishlany, supra note 20, at 166.
See ATTWOOD, supra note 1, at 37 (citing the research of Carina Gillberg and

Christopher Gillberg, Asperger Syndrome - Some Epidemiological Considerations: A

Research Note, 30 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. PSYCHIATRY 631, 631-38 (1989)).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26.

AS was not listed in the World Health Organization's classification manual until

1993, and AS did not appear in the DSM until 1994.

See WORLD HEALTH

ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES AND RELATED
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World Health Organization acknowledged AS for the first time in its
diagnostic manual, the International Statistical Classification of Diseases
and Related Health Problems ("ICD-10"). 27 The ICD-10 distinguishes
AS from autism by stating that unlike autistic people, AS individuals
delay [] or retardation in language or in cognitive
have "no general
28
development.
In 1994, the American Psychiatric Association included AS in the
29
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("DSM-IV").
Because Asperger's Syndrome was not listed in the-DSM-IV prior to
1994, many United States clinicians (and those foreign clinicians using
the DSM-IV as diagnostic criteria) were not formally trained to diagnose
this condition in adults. 30 The diagnostic criteria for Asperger's
Syndrome in the DSM-IV and ICD-10 are remarkably similar,31 though
been criticized as too restrictive and unworkable in clinical
both have
32
practice.
The Gillberg criteria appear to more accurately represent the traits
described by Dr. Asperger.33 Many clinicians in Europe and Australia
use the Gillberg criteria when diagnosing AS; clinicians in the United
States use the DSM-IV criteria.34 In the view of one expert, clinicians
currently detect and diagnose only fifty percent of children who have
AS.35 The remaining undiagnosed children with AS are either able to
evaluation or are completely misdiagnosed
conceal their AS traits during
36
through clinician error.
The novelty surrounding AS has yet to yield an international
diagnostic standard. Current, official diagnostic standards are a "work in
progress" with no existing international standard.37 Depending on the
criteria used for diagnosis, the prevalence rate for AS may be as high as

HEALTH PROBLEMS

(10th ed.) (2006) (hereinafter ICD-10); see also DSM-IV, supra note

3.
27. See lCD-10, supra note 26.
28. Id.
29. DSM-IV, supra note 3.
30. See Haskins & Silva, supra note 11, at 374.
31. See ATrwoOD, supra note 1, at 36; see also Haskins & Silva, supra note 11, at
374 (comparing the diagnostic criteria used by the DSM-IV-TR, ICD- 10 and the Gillberg
criteria).
32. See ATrWOOD, supra note 1, at 44-45. The DSM-IV-TR criteria require a
diagnosis of autism if those criteria are concurrently satisfied with AS. Attwood notes
that based on this hierarchical system, a diagnosis of AS is "almost impossible." Id.
33. Id. at 46.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37.

See ATTwOOD, supra note 1, at 45-54.
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one in 250.38 With no existing universal diagnostic standard, it is likely
that a large number of people with AS remain undiagnosed.39
B.

Legal Significance of the Traits of Asperger's Syndrome

Despite their differences, the DSM-IV, ICD-10 and the Gillberg
criteria all contain references to essentially the same sets of traits. The
list below follows the major headings in the Gillberg criteria and
explains the legal significance of each trait.
1.

Social Impairment

The social impairment typical of AS is satisfied when two of the
following characteristics are present: 1) difficulty interacting with peers;
2) indifference to peer contacts; 3) difficulty interpreting social cues; or
4) socially and emotionally inappropriate behavior.40 Mentally healthy
individuals can be described as neurotypical. 41 Generally, a neurotypical
individual possesses the ability to infer the cognitive, perceptual, and
affective life of themselves as well as others. 42 Dr. Simon Baron-Cohen
coined the term "mindblindness"
to describe the impairment of people
43
who do not have this ability.

People with Asperger's Syndrome are said to have mindblindness
because they frequently misunderstand social cues and cannot
comprehend that other people can have different emotional reactions to
the same event.44 Mindblindness is legally significant because it
prevents individuals from perceiving and understanding the effect their
conduct has on the emotional and cognitive states of others.45 For
example, suppose an AS individual completed the physical elements of a
particular crime. But because of mindblindness, the individual had no
idea how their conduct might affect others. Thus, the individual neither
anticipated nor intended to achieve the particular outcome their conduct
produced.

38. Id. at 46.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 37.
41. See Sinclair, supra note 9.
42. See Haskins & Silva, supra note 11, at 378 (referring to this ability as "Theory of
Mind" (ToM)).
43.

See SIMON BARON-COHEN, MINDBLINDNESS: AN ESSAY ON AUTISM AND THEORY

OF MIND 51 (The MIT Press, 1996) (1995).
Baron-Cohen coined the term
"mindblindness" to describe the inability to utilize ToM abilities. Id.
44. See Haskins & Silva, supra note 11, at 378.
45. Id.
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Narrow Interest Fixations

The presence of at least one of the following characteristics
establishes the narrow interest trait of AS: 1) exclusion of other
activities; 2) repetitive adherence; or, 3) repetition that is more roteroutine than meaning.4 6 Individuals with AS are likely to gather large
amounts of data on narrow topics (for example, "snakes, names of stars,
deep fat fryers, weather information, personal information on members
of Congress" A7) in an intense fashion "without genuine understanding of
the broader phenomenon involved. 48
While there is little research on the origin of the narrow interest
compulsion associated with AS, these interests appear to serve several
functions for AS individuals. 49 The narrow interest fixations may help
AS individuals overcome anxiety and help them achieve coherence in
life.50 In addition, a narrow interest fixation may help AS individuals
understand the physical world and perceive a sense of identity. 5' Finally,
the fixations may help AS individuals relax and serve as a source of
happiness and discussion.52
Narrow interest fixations are legally significant because in the event
that an AS individual gets into trouble, the narrow interest fixation could
be used as extrinsic evidence against them. The individual's unusual,
detailed and extensive narrow interest could be used to show cognizance
and comprehension-that the individual is able to interpret and
understand things on an advanced level.5 3 AS individuals are intelligent
and have comprehension skills; 54 but proving intelligence and
organization through the conduct surrounding a narrow interest does not
necessarily equate to comprehension in other areas.55
Further, if a criminal offense parallels or appears to stem from a
narrow interest fixation, the likely inference facing the AS defendant is
that the crime was premeditated. However, the presence of large
amounts of data or material on a specific topic is not dispositive on the

46. See ATTWOOD, supra note 1, at 37.
47. See Klin, supra note 8, at S9.
48. Id. at S10 (noting that while this trait is not easily discernable in children,
eventually the interests become more unusual and narrowly focused).
49. See ATMWOOD, supra note 1, at 182.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See ATTWOOD, supra note 1, at 182-88.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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issue of whether an AS individual is planning to commit a crime related
to the narrow interest fixation. 56
3.

Compulsion to Routines

AS individuals have a compulsion to establish routines that affect
all aspects of the individual's life, and may affect others.57 Individuals
with AS have poor intuition and lack the ability to spontaneously adapt
in social situations.
They have a tendency toward very literal
interpretations of what people say. 59 As a result, they rely on rigid social
conventions or formalistic rules of behavior for guidance in social
situations. 60. This reliance gives the impression of social naivete. 61
The appearance of na'ivet6 makes the AS individual susceptible to
suggestion.
Such naivet&, when combined with the social impairment
explained above, makes an AS individual especially vulnerable to getting
tricked into committing crimes because they were told that the conduct in
question was acceptable.63 Interpreting the command literally, the AS
individual might
follow an order without regard to its inappropriate or
64
illegal nature.

Furthermore, individuals with AS are more likely to overreact when
their routines are interrupted.65 The overreaction may lead to the
commission of a crime that the individual had not contemplated.66 Here
again, the result is not one that the individual intended.
4.

Speech Irregularities

The speech peculiarities associated with AS typically involve at
least three of the following characteristics:
1) delayed speech
development; 2) superficially perfect expressive language; 3) formal
pedantic language; 4) odd prosody, or peculiar voice characteristics; or
5) impairment of comprehension including misinterpretation of literal or
implied meanings.6 7 Typically, people with AS lacks inflection and
56. See State v. Boyd, 143 S.W.3d 36, 45 (Mo. 2004) (explaining that psychologist
testifying that defendant's interest in "odd subjects" does not increase likelihood that
defendant would engage in conduct related to the "odd subject").
57. See ATTWOOD, supra note 1, at 37.
58. See Klin, supra note 8, at S9.
59. See ATTWOOD, supra note 1, at 115.
60. See Klin, supra note 8, at S9.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See Haskins & Silva, supranote 11, at 382.
64. See ATrWOOD, supra note 1, at 335.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 37.
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intonation in their voice, making them sound almost monotone when
they speak.68 Their conversations sound tangential or without context,
giving the general impression of incoherence. 69 Individuals suffering
from AS are often long-winded, and sometimes fail to make a point even
after long discourse.7 °
Speech irregularities are legally significant when considering
communication between AS sufferers and law enforcement officials,
during hearings, or before a jury or parole board.71 Undoubtedly, the AS
individual will not communicate with others in what is considered
"normal" or anticipated styles 72 (for example, showing "signs of
boredom, haste to leave, and [a peculiar] need for privacy"). 73 As a
result, their odd intonation and flat affect might convey a lack of
remorse. 74 Further, AS individuals have a pattern of immediate
confession to crimes. 75 Believing their conduct is justified, they "cannot
understand what all the fuss is about. 7 6 These communication
irregularities may serve to reinforce criminal justice officials' notions of
culpability in the person.
5.

Nonverbal Communication Problems

The presence of any one of the following characteristics establishes
nonverbal communication traits peculiar to an AS individual: 1) limited
use of gestures; 2) clumsy/gauche body language; 3) limited facial
expressions; 4) inappropriate facial expression; or, 5) peculiar, stiff
gaze.77 Individuals with Asperger's Syndrome may react inappropriately
or fail to comprehend the context of a social interaction.78 Miscues, flat

68. See Klin, supra note 8, at S9. AS individuals might exhibit jerky speech or
appear to speak too fast with little appreciation for the communicative effect or social
perception of the volume of their speaking voice.
69. Id. (explaining that the appearance of incoherence is a result of "one-sided
egocentric conversational style").
70. Id. (explaining that in spite of verbose conversations, individuals may never
come to a point or conclusion).
71. For a thorough and thoughtful analysis of interactions between law enforcement
officials and people with autistic spectrum disorders like AS, see generally Elizabeth
Hervey Osborn, "What Ever Happened To Paul's Law"?: Insights On Advocating for
Better Training and Better Outcomes In Encounters Between Law Enforcement And
Persons With Autistic Spectrum Disorders,79 U. COLO. L. REv. 333 (2008).
72. See Klin, supra note 8, at S9.
73. Id.
74. See Haskins & Silva, supra note 11, at 382.
75. See ATTWOOD,supra note 1,at 339.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 37.
78. See Klin, supra note 8, at S9.
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facial expression, and the overall distant affect of AS individuals are
often interpreted by other people as insensitivity or a lack of empathy.79
The perceived lack of empathy or remorse is legally significant
because it might be mistaken as an indicator of psychopathy.8 °
Psychopaths are human predators, while AS individuals are socially
naive and immature.81 While both give the impression of a lack of
empathy, the psychopath actually has no remorse, whereas the AS
individual's outward communicative cues simply do not express remorse
in expected and anticipated ways.82
6.

Motor Clumsiness

Poor performance in a neurodevelopmental test establishes the
motor clumsiness criteria associated with AS.83 Individuals with
Asperger's Syndrome are often visibly uncoordinated or walk with a
stilted or bouncy gait. 84 They may have been delayed in acquiring motor
skills such as riding a bicycle or catching a ball.85
Poor motor skills could operate to negate the physical elements, or
actus reus, of a crime. If the motor clumsiness associated with AS
renders a person physically incapable of completing the crime, criminal
culpability could not be assigned to that person.
In summary, the AS individual is usually an intelligent and highfunctioning person whose developmental disorder hinders their social
interactions.86 Under certain conditions, the way that the developmental
disorder inhibits their cognitive and behavioral abilities may make the
AS individual susceptible to criminal prosecutions.87 The developmental
disorder further compounds their situation once taken into custody,
where most law enforcement officials lack training in recognizing AS. 88
III. CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF THE AS INDIVIDUAL ACCUSED OF A CRIME
Does the presence of AS in an individual effectively negate
culpability? If not a complete bar, to what degree is an AS individual
liable for criminal conduct? Criminal liability in the United States,

79.

Id.

80.

See ATTWOOD, supra note 1, at 339.

81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 37.
84. See Klin, supra note 8, at S10.
85. Id.
86. See ATTwoOD, supra note 1, at 32.
87. E.g., id. at 335; Haskins & Silva, supra note 11, at 374; Katz & Zemishlany,
supra note 18, at 166.
88. See ATrwOOD, supra note 1, at 338-39.
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Australia and England requires the physical performance of the illegal
act (actus reus) combined with the mental will to engage in that conduct
(mens rea).89 A brief examination of these components of criminal law
will help reveal how AS individuals can fall through the cracks of the
criminal justice system.
A.

Actus Reus-The Physical Conduct Element of CriminalCulpability

Criminal culpability in the United States, Australia and England
flows from the completion of the physical act of crime accompanied by a
required mental state. 90 However, if an individual has a handicap that
renders them physically incapable of acting, this handicap could operate
as a complete bar to criminal culpability depending on physical conduct.
Some level of motor skills delay is a recurring trait of AS
individuals. 91 In general, AS does not affect motor function in a way that
would impair an individual from completing the physical element of a
crime.9 2 AS may make completion of some tasks more difficult,
depending on the level of motor skill coordination the task requires.93
However, there is no evidence to suggest that the motor skills delay
renders an AS individual physically incapable of committing a crime.
B.

Mens Rea-The Mental Element of Criminal Culpability

Criminal law theory in the United States and Australia has been
heavily influenced by the English common law model. The following is
a brief sketch of the origins of mens rea theory in England, and the ways
in which the United States and Australia have adopted and modified the
theory.

89. See COMMONWEALTH CRIMINAL CODE ACT, 1995, c. 1, div. 4-5 (Austl.)
(providing the physical and fault elements for criminal conduct in Australian
Commonwealth Criminal Code); see MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01, 2.02 (1962)
(providing the physical and mental culpability requirements for crimes as has been
adopted in almost forty United States' jurisdictions); see generally R v. Bateman, (1925)
19 Crim. App. 8 (Eng.) (providing a test for conduct and mental state resulting in
criminal liability).
90. See Commonwealth Criminal Code Act, 1995, c. 1, div. 4-5; see MPC §§ 2.01,
2.02; see generally Bateman, 19 Crim. App. 8.
91. See ATTWOOD, supra note 1, at 335.
92. See id.
93. Id. at 259-61.
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1.

94
The English Approach to Mens Rea in Criminal Law

English statutory law and common law applies the common law
maxim "the deed does not make a man guilty unless his mind be
guilty.

'95

In his thirteenth-century treatise, legal scholar Henry Bracton

wrote that "[it] is will and purpose which mark maleficia" and "a crime
is not committed unless the intention to injure exists. 9 6 Bracton's
writings reveal the view that criminal culpability required a culpable
state of mind accompanying prohibited conduct. 97 Further, the criminal's
state of mind must intend injury to occur. 98 As such, an individual acting
with a free mind, when choosing evil over good, was deemed morally
blameworthy. 99

Bracton's discussions of the culpability of children and the insane
further clarify the "willful" component of intent. 10 0 According to
Bracton, infants and the insane are excluded from culpability due to their
inability to make rational choices between right and wrong. 10 ' In
Bracton's view, infants are capable only of innocent designs while the
insane are considered to be without reason altogether.'0 2
These
observations are known in modem criminal law as "excuse defenses." In
an excuse defense, blameworthy conduct by the actor is excused due to
the absence of the requisite state of mind.' 03

94. For an excellent, in-depth study of the evolution of the doctrine of mens rea in
English criminal law, see Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the
Role of Motive in the Criminal Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 651-681
(1993).
95. See R v. Tolson (1889) 23 Q.B. 168, 187 (Eng.) (Stephen, J., dissenting). Lord
Stephen's impression of the maxim is
The full definition of every crime contains expressly or by implication a
proposition as to a state of mind. Therefore, if the mental element of any
conduct alleged to be a crime is proved to have been absent in a given case, the
crime so defined is not committed; or, again, if a crime is fully defined nothing
amounts to that crime which does not satisfy that definition.
Id.
96. 2 HENRY D. BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 384 (Samuel E.
Thome trans., 1968). Presumably, a royal pardon was no longer required to negate the
strict liability punishment of death for accidental killings or self-defense. Id.
97. Id. at 984-85.
98. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 96, at 340-41. Bracton wrote that a person who kills
another to save his family from death was not punished for homicide, since the act of
killing was unavoidable and performed with "sorrow of heart."
99. See Francis E. Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1019 (1932).
100. Id. at 985-86.
101. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 96, at 424.
102. See Sayre, supra note 99, at 985-86.
103. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE art. 3 (1962) (providing the "justification"
defenses of self-defense and choice of evils, justifying otherwise blameworthy conduct in
the actor due to surrounding circumstances); MODEL PENAL CODE art. 4 (1962) (providing
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In the centuries following Bracton's time, the principle of mens rea
has been more precisely refined. 10 4 General requirements of "evil intent"
eventually gave way to specifically defined mental states for crimes and
common law felonies. 10 5 By the seventeenth century, convictions for
06
burglary, larceny and arson required a showing of specific intent.
These basic mens
rea principles endure to the present day in English
07
1
law.
criminal
Currently, England is one of the very few developed countries
without a criminal code. 10 8 Criminal behavior is defined and prohibited
09
through a combination of legislative action and common law offenses.'
Mens rea requirements for offenses are described in legislative
enactments describing and outlawing conduct."l 0 The specific mental
states required for common law offenses have been defined through
judicial decisions."' Assessment of mens rea is provided for in Section

the "excuse" defenses of mental defect and immaturity to exclude actors from
culpability).
104. See Sayre, supra note 99, at 989.
105. Id. at 994.
106. Id. at 994-1004.
107. See id. at 1003. Sayre notes that the mental state required for a common law
arson conviction has not changed since the seventeenth century, but the general
requirement of "malice" has narrowed to a specific intent to bum a building. Id.
108. See P.R. GLAZEBROOK, BLACKSTONE'S STATUTES ON CRIMINAL LAW 2004-2005
xxvi (14th ed.) (2004).
109. Id.; see also PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW CASE STUDIES AND
CONTROVERSIES 48 (2d ed. 2005).
110. See GLAZEBROOK, supra note 108.
111. See, e.g., R v. Bateman, (1925) 19 Crim. App. 8 (Eng.) The Bateman court
explained that in order to establish mens rea for criminal liability:
The facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the
accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and
showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime
against the State and conduct deserving punishment.
Id. at 11-12; see R v. Cunningham, [1957] 2 Q.B. 396 (Eng.) The court in Cunningham
stated the mens rea standard for recklessness as follows:
In any statutory definition of a crime, malice must be taken... as requiring
either: (1) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was
done; or (2) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not (i.e. the
accused has foreseen that the particular kind of harm might be done and yet has
gone on to take the risk of it).
Id. at 399-400; R v. Mohan, (1976) Q.B. 1, 8 (Eng.) The Mohan court provided the mens
rea standard for direct intention: an "aim or purpose".-"a decision to bring about, insofar
as it lies within the accused's power, the commission of the offence ... no matter
whether the accused desired that consequence of his act or not." Id. (quoting R. v. Hyam
[1975] A.C. 55, 74); see also 17 ARCHBOLD: CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND
PRACTICE §§ 34-66a (James Richardson, ed., Sweet & Maxwell, Ltd. 2004) (describing
the requirements needed to establish the specific mental states of with intent to, attempts
to, negligently, unlawfully, maliciously, willfully, knowingly, suspects, recklessly,
fraudulently, dishonestly, causes, and permits, in English criminal law contexts).
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Eight of the Criminal Justice Act of 1967. 12 That assessment calls for a
"totality of the circumstances" evaluation of what harm the offender
13
intended as opposed to what harm he actually caused.'
2.

Australian Approach to Mens Rea in Criminal Law

Like England, Australia's criminal law system has evolved through
Australian judicial decisions and legislative activity. As a former British
colony, English criminal statutes became the basis for state and territorial
criminal law in Australia.' 1 4 The Commonwealth of Australia (or federal
government) has its own criminal jurisdiction and criminal code for
federal offenses. 5
Of the eight Australian states within the
Commonwealth of Australia, five have adopted criminal codes. 1 6 The
other three are common law jurisdictions that have passed crimes acts
7
listing offenses and punishments." 1
One of the eight Australian states, Queensland, has adopted a
criminal code that assigns the mens rea requirement directly into the
offense description." 8 Therefore, when no mens rea component is listed,
the mental state required is irrelevant." 9
In contrast, The
Commonwealth Criminal Code separates offense elements into "Physical
Elements" and "Fault Elements.'

20

The Physical Elements correspond

to actus reus requirements and the Fault Elements correspond to mens
rea requirements. 121 Further, the Commonwealth Code, very similar to
112. See Criminal Justice Act, 1967, c. 80, § 8 (U.K.). The act provides as follows:
A court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence,
(a) shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended or foresaw a result of
his actions by reasons only of its being a natural and probable
consequence of those actions; but
(b) shall decide whether he did intend or foresee that result by reference to
all the evidence, drawing such inferences from the evidence as appear
proper in the circumstances.
113. See Criminal Justice Act, 1967, c. 80, § 8 (U.K.).
114. See Ian Leader-Elliot, Benthamite Reflections on Codification of the General
Principles of Criminal Liability: Towards the Panopticon, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 391,
392 (2006).
115. See Crimes Act, 1914 (Austl.) and Commonwealth Criminal Code Act, 1995
(Austl.).

116. See Criminal Code Act, 1899 (Queensl.) (Austl.); Criminal Code Act, 1902 (W.
Australia); Criminal Code Act, 1983 (N. Terr.) (Austl.); Criminal Code Act, 1995 (Austl.
Cap. Terr.) (Austl.).
117. See, e.g., Crimes Act, 1900 (N.S.W.) (Austl.).
118. See Criminal Code Act, 1899, c. 5 § 23, § 2 (Queensl.) (Austl.) The subsection
provides in pertinent part that "[u]nless the intention to cause a particular result is
expressly declared to be an element of the offence constituted, in whole or part, by an act
or omission, the result intended to be caused by an act or omission is immaterial." Id.
119. Id.
120. See Commonwealth Criminal Code Act, 1995, c. 1, div. 4-5 (Austl.).
121. Id.
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the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code, provides definitions for
each of
the mens rea elements for crimes under the Commonwealth
122
Code.
United States' Approach to Mens Rea in Criminal Law

3.

Following the Revolutionary War, American colonies adopted a
criminal law system modeled after the English system. 123 Building on
the summaries of existing English common law and criminal law in
Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England,124 American courts
developed and refined criminal law. 125 Because each state has
lawmaking autonomy, legislatures crafted their own criminal legislation
26
resulting in great disparity in criminal law across the United States. 1
Ultimately, the American Legal Institute drafted the Model Penal
Code. 127 This code sets out an analytical framework for the physical and
mental elements for specific crimes. 128 The Model Penal Code provides
four levels of intentional conduct: negligent, reckless, knowing and
purposeful.129 By 2002, forty states adopted the Model Penal Code. 3 0
In summary, all three nations' legal systems require an individual to
have a certain mental state during the commission of a crime to be found
criminally culpable. Mens rea doctrine has evolved to require specific
intent for certain crimes.
IV. DISCUSSION OF RECENT CASE DEVELOPMENTS

The peculiar impairments associated with AS,. particularly
mindblindness, interfere with an individual's ability to understand other
people's emotional or mental states. 13 1 As a result, people with AS may
engage in criminal violations without -the mens rea required for the
assessment of criminal culpability. Most United States cases where AS
is raised to negate mens rea end unfavorably for the defendant.' 32 In
122.

Id.

123. See ROBINSON, supra note 109, at 23.
124. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
reprinted in 1969).
125. See ROBINSON, supra note 109, at 23.
126. Id. at 25.
127.

ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND

(1803,

See MODEL PENAL CODE (1962).

128. Id. §§ 2.01, 2.02.
129. Id. § 2.02.
130. See MARKUS D. DUBBER, CRIMINAL LAW: MODEL PENAL CODE 50 (2002).
131. See BARON-COHEN, supra note 43; Haskins & Silva, supra note 11, at 378.
132. United States cases where AS has been unsuccessfully raised as a defense or
mitigating factor include: Martlett v. State, 2007 WL 4555274, at *4 (Ind. App. Dec. 28,
2007) (explaining that impairments attributed to AS do not warrant overwhelming weight
in assessment of his character); United States v. Lange, 445 F.3d 983, 987 (7th Cir. 2006)
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England, the courts consider AS a factor that can mitigate sentencing or
result in an order for new trial. 33 Courts in Australia have very seldom
dealt with AS in criminal contexts, but the cases they have decided are
revealing. To better understand the legal implications of AS, this section
will explore a number of cases involving defendants with AS and how
that factor was considered at trial.
A.

UnitedStates Cases

According to the Autism Society of America, only twenty-two cases
exist in the United States where AS was raised to show diminished
capacity and avoid conviction of a criminal offense. 134 One notable
example involved Robert Durst, a wealthy eccentric with AS, who was
acquitted of murder charges for killing his neighbor.1 35 The following
cases involve defendants with AS and how that factor was considered at
trial.
1. State v. Boyd: AS Offered as Evidence Defendant Did Not
Commit the Crime
In June 2004, the Missouri Court of Appeals ordered a new trial for
an AS defendant convicted of murder. 36 In State v. Boyd, James Boyd
was accused of murdering a sixteen-year-old boy. 137 Boyd denied

(explaining that AS impairment held insufficient to prove lack of volition necessary for
establishment of diminished capacity defense); Schoenwetter v. State, 931 So.2d 857,
875 (Fl. 2006) (explaining that AS impairment rejected as a mitigating factor in multiple
homicide); People v. Youngerman, 838 N.E.2d 103, 111-13 (Ill. 2005) (explaining that
defendant's diagnosis of AS subsequent to involuntary commitment insufficient to
warrant release from commitment); State v. Santiago, 634 S.E.2d 23, 28-29 (S.C. App.
2006) (holding that expert testimony that defendant had AS not admissible to establish
that defendant did not have requisite mens rea to commit murder; South Carolina does
not recognize diminished capacity defense).
133. See, e.g., R v. Dusic, [2006] EWCA(Crim) 2511,
29, 30 (Eng.); R v. Malik
[2006] EWCA(Crim) 2349,
13, 14, 21 (Eng.); R v. Smith, [2004] EWCA(Crim) 2531,
5, 8, 9 (Eng.); R v. Grey, [2004] EWCA(Crim) 1446,
8, 11, 14, 17 (Eng.); R v
Reynolds, [2004] EWCA(Crim) 1834,
6, 17, 18 (Eng.) (reducing sentences in each
case due to introduction of evidence showing defendants had AS). One recent case
presented evidence of AS as part of a diminished capacity defense to homicide. See R v.
Jama, [2004] EWCA(Crim) 960, 33 (Eng.) (ordering new trial for defendant due to
improper instructions by trial judge on the relationship between provocation and AS in
diminished capacity defense).
134. See Brian R. Ballou & Michael Levenson, School Killing Stuns Suburbs,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 2007, at IA.
135. See Lucy Bannerman, Millionaire who cut up body is freed; Killing was an
accident,says eccentric, THE HERALD (Glasgow), Nov. 12, 2003, at 10.
136. See State v. Boyd, 143 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Mo. 2004).
137. Id.
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participation in the crime altogether. 138 At trial, Boyd sought to
introduce evidence that he suffered from AS to prove four points relevant
to his claim of innocence.' 39 First, he argued that he was too
40
uncoordinated to overpower and subdue a victim twice his size.1
Second, he argued that he could not have navigated the forty-acre tract of
woods to lead other people to the location of the body.' 4' Next, he
argued that AS offered an innocent explanation for his unusual interest in
violent books.' 42 Last, he argued that AS made him particularly gullible
and susceptible to manipulation by others. 43 The trial court excluded the
expert testimony because it related to a mental illness.' 44 Such evidence
a diminished capacity
is barred in Missouri when introduced to establish
46
defense. 145 As a result, Boyd was convicted.
On appeal, the appellate court noted that Boyd was not seeking to
enter the evidence under a diminished capacity defense.' 47 Such a tactic
would have invoked the legislation and case law relied on by the trial
judge.148 Instead, Boyd claimed he did not commit the murder, 149 and
presented evidence of AS to support this defense theory. 150 As such, the
appellate court found the trial court's determination that the evidence had
to be evaluated according to Missouri diminished capacity evidence rules
was erroneous. 5' The appellate court held that the trial judge's decision
was erroneous. 52 The case was reversed and a
to exclude the evidence
53
new trial ordered. 1
2. State v. Burr: Evidence of AS Relevant to Show that
Defendant Did Not Understand Social Cues and Acts Inappropriately as
a Result
In State v. Burr, the New Jersey Superior Court ordered a new trial
for Franklin Burr.' 54 Burr had been convicted of second-degree assault
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Boyd, 143 S.W.3d at 39.
Id.
Id.

144.

Id.

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Boyd, 143 S.W.3d at 36.
Id. at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 39-40.
Boyd, 143 S.W.3d at 39.
Id. at 47.
Id.
See State v. Burr, 921 A.2d 1135, 1159 (N.J. Super. 2007).
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and third-degree endangering the welfare of a child for inappropriately
touching one of his pupils. 15 5 At a preliminary hearing, Burr appeared in
court with bag draped over his head. 156 When questioned about his
appearance, he replied with quotations from the book of Deuteronomy.' 57
Subsequently, Burr underwent a psychiatric evaluation and was
diagnosed with Asperger's Syndrome. 158 At trial, Burr attempted to
introduce expert testimony about the AS diagnosis to help the jury
understand why he might act in a way that appears socially unacceptable
or inappropriate to others. 159 The trial judge refused to admit the
testimony, opining that it was not relevant to the issue of culpability. 60
On appeal, the Superior Court reversed, holding that evidence
showing Burr suffered from AS was relevant in determining how Burr
thought about his actions, and that such evidence could have 62impacted
1
the jury's decision. 16 The appellate judge ordered a new trial.
B.

English Cases

The following English cases involve appeals where the particular
impairments of AS were raised as mitigating or exculpating factors.
1. R v. Heather: Reduction in Culpability for Arson Resulting
from Narrow Interest Fixation
On February 4, 2000, John Heather was sentenced to three years
imprisonment for setting a garbage dumpster on fire. 163 Heather had

155. Id. at 1137-38.
156. Id. at 1142, n. 5.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1142. The court went on to paraphrase the American Psychiatric
Association's diagnostic criteria for AS:
The American Psychiatric Association recognizes Asperger's Disorder as a
distinct diagnosis. According to the DSM-IV, the "essential features" of the
disorder are "severe and sustained impairment in social interaction ... and the
development of restricted, repetitive patterns of behavior, interests, and
activities." In order to constitute Asperger's Disorder, the "disturbance must
cause clinically significant impairment in social, occupational, or other
important areas of functioning."
Id. (quoting the American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and StatisticalManual of
MentalDisorders, 75-77 (4th ed. 1994) (DSM-IV)).
159. Burr, 921 A.2d at 1143.

160.
161.

Id.
Id. at 1149.

162. Id. at 1159.
163. See R v. Heather, 2000 WL 1421166, 2 (Eng. July 31, 2000). The defendant
pled guilty to one count of simple arson and not guilty to arson with reckless
endangerment to life. Id.
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been convicted of arson three times in the past,' 64 and he was punished
with probation for each conviction. 65 Heather had been diagnosed with
AS, 166 and one of his AS-related behavior patterns was a compulsion to
start fires. 167 The sentencing judge reviewed reports from a consulting
psychiatrist and a consulting psychologist regarding Heather's mental
condition. 68 The sentencing judge concluded that a three-year sentence
would both protect the public and minimize the time Heather would be
69
incarcerated.
After serving almost twelve months of his sentence, Heather's case
was heard by the appellate court. 170 The appellate court quashed the
prison sentence in exchange for a three-year probation order and released
Heather subject to certain conditions, including receiving treatment and
17 1
obeying a curfew for six months.
2.
R v. Gibson: Recent AS Diagnosis Contributes to Reduction
in Sentence
On December 15, 2000, Simon Gibson was sentenced to eighteen
months imprisonment for burglary in a cemetery and disinterring a
body.' 72 Gibson and two accomplices had entered and disturbed a crypt
three separate times at the Amos Vale Cemetery in Bristol, England.' 7 3
Gibson admitted to taking pieces of bone, a skull and a memorial vase
out of the cemetery and opening a coffin to view its contents.174 The trial
judge heard evidence that Gibson suffered from AS. 75 However, the
76
trial judge sentenced him to eighteen months in jail.

164. Id. 1 5. The defendant was known in his neighborhood as the "fire-lighter" for
his tendency to start fires. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. 14.
167. Id.
168. Heather,2000 WL 1421166,16.
169. Id. Heather had lived all his life at home with his mother, who was over eighty
years old at the time of sentencing. She indicated at sentencing that having John live
with her was becoming too great a responsibility for her, and the sentencing judge
indicated that the Court of Appeal may have "greater powers than he" to place Heather in
a group residence. Id. 1 7.
170. Id.
171. Id. 1 9. In summary, the conditions were that Heather receive psychiatric
services and care as instructed by the probation team, that he reside where the probation
officer instructs him to and that he abide by an electronically monitored curfew for six
months. Id.
172. See R v. Gibson, [2001] EWCA (Crim) 656, 1 (Eng.).
173. Id. 13.
174. Id.
175. Id. 11 10, 12. When the defendant was four years old, his father committed
suicide. The defendant lived at home with his mother and younger brother. The brother
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On appeal, the appellate court noted that even though the
punishment was correct in principle, Gibson's exceptional circumstances
should have produced a different sentence. 177 The appellate judge
focused on the defendant's narrow interest in bones and death.7 8 A
report from a psychiatrist who examined Gibson stated that his
continuing obsession with death is a "manifestation of Asperger's
Syndrome."' 179 This obsession with death made Gibson unable to resist
the temptation to take the bones.180 Further, expert analysis also revealed
that Gibson's death obsession had led him to make several attempts
against his own life.' 81 The consensus among people evaluating Gibson
was that 8a2 prison sentence would carry with it a very high risk of suicide
for him.
After considering these issues, the appellate court concluded that a
probation order conditioned on treatment would have been the
appropriate sentence. 8 3 Accordingly, the court reduced the sentence
to
84
six months which effectively released Gibson for time served.'
3. R v. TS: AS Presented as Fresh Evidence of Cognitive
Impairment Results in New Trial
On August 12, 2005, a defendant identified as "TS" was convicted
of rape and indecent assault.' 85 TS had engaged in sexual conduct with
his ex-wife, which he claimed was consensual. 86 His ex-wife claimed
87
that the encounter was not consensual, amounting to assault and rape.'
When instructing the jury on the mens rea element of rape, the judge
mentioned the possibility for misunderstanding in a situation where a
woman did not make clear that she did not consent to the sexual
activity.1 8 However, the judge instructed the jury that there was no

had Downe's Syndrome. The defendant spoke of attempting suicide again in the future,
stating that he felt life had "nothing to help him." Id.
176. Gibson, EWCA (Crim) 656, 9 1.
177. Id. 7.
178. Id. TT 9, 16.
179. Id. 916.
180. Gibson, EWCA (Crim) 656, 9 9.
181. Id.
182. Id. 14, 16, 18.
183. Id. 19.
184. Id. 20.
185. SeeR v. TS, 2008 WL 168748, 91 (2008) (Eng. Crim Jan. 23, 2008).
186. Id. 7.
187. Id. 6.
188. Id. 9.
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room for doubt or misunderstanding in this case. 189 The jury found TS
190
guilty.
TS's pro se appeals were denied,' 9' and his mental and physical
192
condition began to deteriorate as he began to serve his prison sentence.
An application from a legal aid worker and a letter from the diagnosing
physician was sent to the judge on behalf of TS, explaining the recent
diagnosis of AS. 193 Counsel was appointed to the defendant and a new
appeal was allowed. 194 During the appeal, TS argued that AS impaired
his ability to accurately determine other people's intentions, beliefs or
desires "in ambiguous situations."' 95 He also argued that AS impaired
his ability
to understand signs and straightforward indications from other
96
people. 1
The appellate court held that the new evidence could have affected
the trial in one or more of the following ways. 19 7 First, it would have
enabled a defense based on the requirements of mens rea.' 98 Second, the
evidence showing TS suffered from AS would have helped the jury
understand why he acted under an honest and reasonable belief in what
199
he believed the situation to be, even if the facts were otherwise.
Finally, the AS diagnosis could have helped the jury understand why TS
acted strangely at trial.200 As a result, the appellate court ordered a
retrial.20 '

189. Id.
190. TS, 2008 WL 168748, 1.
191. Id. 12. The defendant's grounds for appeal included ineffective counsel,
improper suppression of evidence by the trial judge of the defendant's psychological
problems and fresh evidence from the defendant's sister to the effect that the victim told
her no rape had occurred. Id.
192. Id.The defendant refused to take the anti-psychotic medicine he was prescribed
and denied he had any mental health problems. He claimed he was wrongfully
imprisoned because he believed he had prevailed in his pro se appeals. He was
transferred to a medium security forensic hospital where he was diagnosed with AS. Id.
193. Id. 14-16.
194. Id.
195. TS, 2008 WL 168748, 22.
196. Id.
197. Id. 34.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. TS, 2008 WL 168748, 34.
201. Id. 1.
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Australian Cases
1.

R v. Wood: Impairments of AS Reduce Objective Criminality

On November 28, 2002, George Wood was convicted of
manslaughter by criminal negligence in the death of his mother.20 2 Wood
was sixty years old with no prior criminal record when he was
convicted. 3 Wood lived his whole life with his mother and sister and
had little outside social contacts. 0 4 In 1998, the defendant's mother was
hospitalized twice for various medical problems including mild
dementia. 205 Her assessment upon discharge called for constant care
including regular hospital appointments or home visits. 20 6 The mother
was a domineering person who insisted on having things her way.20 7 In
2 8
0
the past, she resisted all efforts to arrange home care or hospitalization.
The family situation9 from 1998 onward left Wood in charge of taking
20
care of his mother.
In April 2000, Wood called an ambulance to take his mother to a
hospital.2 10 When emergency personnel arrived at the scene, they found
the home in a state of utter disrepair. 21' They also found Wood's mother
bedridden, covered with human waste and other body fluids, and
suffering from serious bedsores.21 2 Wood had not been taking proper
care of his mother which resulted in her condition. Despite hospital
treatment, the woman died.21 3

202. See R v. Wood, (2004) 149 A. Crim. R. 38, 40 (Austl.).
203. Id.
204. Id. The defendant's sister was developmentally disabled. Evidence showed the
defendant had dropped out of school and had only recently gained employment; he had a

short-lived relationship with a woman; he recently became involved at a local church;
and he had an obsessive interest with trains. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Wood, 149 A. Crim. R. at 40.
208.

Id.

209. Id.
210. Id.
211.

Id. The appellate court recounted the scene at the homestead:

There was evidence to the effect that the garden was seriously overgrown and
unkempt, and that the interior was a mess with rubbish and papers, some of
which were kept in bags, piled up in many rooms. The shower had not worked
for some time and it appeared that the bath was not working either.
Newspapers were stacked in the shower recess. The toilet leaked. Thick dust
and cobwebs were evident throughout.
Id.
212. Wood, 149 A. Crim. R. at 40.
213. Id.
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At a bench trial, Wood offered the testimony of a doctor whose
examination of the defendant revealed the presence of nearly all the
diagnostic criteria for AS. 214 This evidence was offered to explain why
Wood would have a lack of understanding of the consequences of his
acts or omissions and an inability to show remorse.21 5 The doctor also
testified that Wood did not appear to appreciate the effect his actions had
on his mother. 1 6
The judge evaluated the culpability of the defendant according to
the standard for criminally negligent manslaughter, which requires
reckless conduct combined with the realization that serious injury or
death are possible outcomes from such conduct.21 7 Applying that
standard, the judge found Wood criminally responsible for creating the
circumstances which "caused, contributed or accelerated" his mother's
death, and that he owed her a duty of care.21 8 The trial judge stated that
he did not believe Wood to have impaired intellectual capacity and "[did
not] regard him as having suffered from any serious psychiatric or
personality disorder., 21 9 The judge further stated that Wood was "in
complete denial concerning the pain and distress that his mother must
have experienced over an extended period," and that he displayed "no
remorse for his actions whatsoever., 220 The judge found Wood guilty of
manslaughter by criminal negligence and sentenced him to seven years
imprisonment.221 Wood appealed the sentence, claiming that the judge
had failed to give adequate weight to the evidence regarding the
defendant's possible AS diagnosis, and that the sentence was manifestly
excessive under the circumstances.222
On appeal, the appellate court reasoned that the evidence of a
mental abnormality tending to explain the offense or "the offender's
214. Id.at 43.
215. Id. Another doctor (presumably from the government) testified that in her
opinion, the defendant did not present any symptoms warranting a diagnosis of AS. The
defendant presented with a "mood disorder" resulting from his socialization. However,
in her final conclusion, she does mention that the defendant's psychopathology was
"possibly complicated by some variant of autism." Id.
216. Id.
217. Wood, 149 A. Crim. R. at 42. The trial judge applied this standard of criminal
negligent manslaughter:
The degree of criminal culpability is set by saying that the accused, having
realised that death or serious injury are possible, must then act recklessly in
relation to those consequences. Further, the test is subjective so far as concerns
the omission to act.
Id. (quoting R v. Stone, [1977] Q.B. 354, 357 (Eng.)).
218. Wood, 149 A. Crim. R. at 40.
219. Id. at43.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 44-46.
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inability to understand the wrongfulness of his actions, or to make
reasonable judgments, or to control his or her faculties and emotions,
will impact on the level of culpability of the offender, even where the
[mental] illness does not amount to an excuse at law., 22 3 The court
found Wood's disorder "impaired his capacity to respond to his
responsibilities," and that this made the defendant less criminally
culpable.224 The appellate court found the trial judge to be in error for
failing to give adequate consideration to the defendant's mental
abnormality. In addition, the appellate court reasoned that punishment
exacted against persons with mental disabilities does little to personally
deter them from future wrongdoing if they are unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of their actions. 2252
Accordingly, the appellate court
reduced Wood's sentence to three years and six months. 26
2. Hopper v. The Queen: Social Cues Clear Enough that AS
Cannot Be Raised to Mitigate Conduct
On March 10, 2003, Bradley Hopper was convicted of several
sexual offences and sentenced to four years imprisonment.22 7 Hopper,228
a
teenager from England, was in Australia for a vacation with his family.
One night he went out with his cousins and a female friend and became
intoxicated.229 When his female friend mentioned she was ready to go,
Hopper offered to walk her home. 230 As the two walked down a street,
Hopper kissed her.23 1 He then attempted to have intercourse with her,
despite her repeated objections.2 32 Hopper continued his advances for
about five minutes before he stopped.233 Under interrogation the next
day, Hopper provided the following explanation for his actions: "Once I
realised what I was doing, I stopped. I thought, 'what the hell am I
doing?' ' 234 A medical examination confirmed that the woman had been
sexually assaulted.235

223. Wood, 149 A. Crim. R. at 45. (quoting R v. Israil, 2002 WL 1435905,
23
(Austi.)).
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Wood, 149 A. Crim. R. at 45.
227. See Hopper v. The Queen, 2003 WL 21694438, 32 (Austl. Ct. Crim. App. July
18, 2003).
228. Id. 37.
229. Id. 34.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Hopper, 2003 WL 21694438, 34.
233. Id.
234. Id. 35.
235. Id.
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At trial, Hopper offered evidence showing he suffered from various
psychological disabilities including difficulty understanding social
cues. 23 6
He argued that the effects of alcohol aggravated his
misunderstanding of social cues.237 Hopper had not yet obtained a
diagnosis of AS. 238 He was found guilty of two counts of sexual
penetration without consent and one count of indecent assault. 239 The
judge adjourned the court for ten days to consider the appropriate
punishment. 240 At sentencing, the judge stated that his decision was
based on the demeanor of the defendant that he observed in the
videotaped police interview. 241 The judge considered the other evidence
tending to show Hopper's disabilities, but concluded that the mitigating
effect of these disabilities was "only peripheral. 24 2 The judge found the
offences to be serious enough to warrant a prison sentence.24 3
Hopper appealed, alleging error on the part of the trial judge for
failing to make inquiries into how the defendant's disabilities could be a
mitigating factor.244 Further, Hopper argued that the trial judge erred by
failing to adequately consider other mitigating factors. 245 Hopper also
offered new evidence that after sentencing, he was suffering from AS.246
However, the appellate court found that despite the defendant's
impairments, the victim had been clear and unambiguous about her
wishes not to have sex with Hopper.247 Accordingly, the appellate court
dismissed the defendant's appeal against the sentence.24 8
D. Analysis
As demonstrated above, defendants have tried to use AS as a
defense to criminal charges in a number of ways. The recurrent themes

236. Id. $ 38.
237. Hopper, 2003 WL 21694438, 38. In addition to the social cues comprehension
problem, the defendant introduced evidence that he had "impairments in cognitive
functioning," dyslexia, his reading level was equivalent to a ten year old, he had memory
problems, and he has difficulty understanding and interpreting verbal instructions. There
was also evidence that showed the defendant to be shy, immature and anxious, and
gullible. He had been bullied and had difficulty functioning in a group setting. Id.
238. Id. 940.
239. Id. 932.
240. Id. 41.
241. Id. 43-44.
242. Hopper, 2003 WL 21694438, 44.
243. Id. TT 45, 46.
244. Id. 47.
245. Id. 47.
246. Id. 40.
247. Hopper, 2003 WL 21694438, 55.
248. Id. T 72.
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can best be organized as failure of proof defense, mistake in fact defense,
and mitigation of offense level.
1.

Failure of Proof Defense

AS has been advanced as evidence proving that the defendant
cannot satisfy the mens rea element for the charged offense. In one case,
the physical impairments associated with AS were raised to cast doubt on
the defendant's capacity to satisfy the actus reus element. In this
context, the impairments
of AS operate as a failure of proof defense to
249
criminal culpability.
In R v. Wood, discussed infra, the defendant was ignorant of the
consequences of his conduct on many levels: he was not capable of
keeping a house clean, much less caring for his elderly, invalid mother.
Considering that the defendant's mother was a domineering person and
the defendant was prone to literal interpretations of her commands, the
defendant's care of his mother can hardly be termed intentional. How
can someone be held morally blameworthy for a result they could not
conceive of because they did not know the underlying facts necessary to
form such a conception? Both the trial judge and the appellate court
missed this essential point. The defendant was less than negligent
because he did not possess enough commonsense facts about health and
hygiene to understand how to apply those facts to his situation. He
simply had no mental state regarding the condition of his mother. As
such, the defendant's lack of understanding negates any finding of
culpability necessary to prove the mens rea elements of the crime.
Conversely, in State v. Boyd, the trial court overlooked the effects
AS may have on the defendant's physical ability to carry out a crime. In
Boyd, the defendant tried to introduce expert testimony that the physical
impairments associated with AS made it impossible for him to have
committed the murder. 250 Part of the testimony included assertions that it
would be "impossible" or "inconceivable" for someone with AS to lead
people to the site where the body was found in the middle of a forty-acre
tract of woods. 25' Further, the defendant openly advanced the notion that
the motor skill delay associated with AS prohibited the defendant from
physically completing the crime. This is a failure of proof defense to
actus reus, a claim that the defendant could not have physically

249. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.2(1) (requiring all elements of an offense be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt for a person to be held criminally responsible);
Commonwealth Code 1995 § 3.2 (providing that all physical and fault elements of an
offense must be proved to create guilt for criminal conduct).
250. See State v. Boyd, 143 S.W.3d 36, 38 (Mo. 2004).
251. Id.at45.
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performed the accused criminal act. The expert testimony did not
actually state that the defendant was physically incapable of
overpowering the victim.
Instead, in the expert's opinion, the
defendant's ability to navigate the forest to lead others to the crime
scene
252
was too complex a task to expect an AS individual to complete.
Yet, other courts have held that new evidence of an AS diagnosis
could negate culpability for lack of the requisite mens rea. By granting a
new trial in R v. TS, the appellate court essentially agreed with the
defendant's failure of proof argument. The defendant maintained a
consistent version of events throughout the trial and appeal, claiming that
the sexual encounter was consensual, not a sexual assault or rape. 253 If
the defendant believed the encounter was consensual, and the
impairments of AS contributed to this mistaken belief, then evidence of
AS could negate the presence of the culpable mental state required for
the defendant's convictions. The appellate court held that new evidence
of the defendant's recent AS diagnosis could prove the absence of
requisite mens rea, and a new trial should be held to determine the
mental state of the defendant at the time of the offense.254
The appellate court in R v. Wood explained the futility of punishing
defendants like those found in Wood and R v. TS. First, punishing
someone who fails to understand the potential consequences of his
conduct and is unlikely to re-offend is of little value as a means of
personal deterrence.2 55 Second, punishing those who have a limited
appreciation for the wrongfulness of their conduct make them poor
examples for the general deterrence of crime.256 A prison sentence is
essentially meaningless to an individual such as this; assigning criminal
culpability and punishment does not serve the needs of the offender or
society.
2.

Mistake in Fact

The effects of AS (especially mindblindness) can result in conduct
based on an honest and reasonable but mistaken belief of facts.
Individuals who engage in criminal conduct based
on such a "mistake-in257
fact" are sometimes excused from culpability.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id.at 46.
See R v. TS, 2008 WL 168748, 33 (2008) (Eng. Crim Jan. 23, 2008).
Id. 34.
See R. v George, (2004) 149 A. Crim. R. 38, 45 (Austl.).
Id.
See 21 AMJUR 2D CRIMINAL LAW § 152 (2007); 17 ARCHBOLD: CRIMINAL

PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE § 10 (James Richardson, ed., Sweet & Maxwell,
Ltd. 2008); CRIMINAL CODE OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY §§ 31(1), 32 (Austl.). Each of

these materials relate the contours of United States, English and Australian mistake-of-
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In State v. Burr, evidence of the defendant's AS diagnosis was
introduced to show that the defendant did not know the inappropriateness
of his behavior. 258wod
In other words, the defendant was operating under the
mistaken belief that what he was doing was acceptable. 259 The defendant
did not argue that his AS diagnosis provided support for a diminished
capacity defense. 260 Instead, the evidence was offered to rebut the
prosecution's allegation that the defendant was engaging in "grooming"
behavior designed to lower the victim's social barriers in preparation for
molestation. 261 This defense strategy effectively sneaks the evidence of
AS in through "the back door." Presented this way, the evidence is not
offered for a diminished capacity defense, but the jury still gets to hear
how AS "diminishes" the defendant's "capacity" to comprehend social
cues and what types of behavior are appropriate. This avenue avoids the
tangled evidence rules often associated with the presentation of a
diminished capacity defense.
However, AS cannot shield a defendant from criminal culpability in
all cases. In Hopper v. The Queen, the appellate court agreed that AS
could impair a defendant's ability to correctly interpret social cues. 262
But, the court rejected the defendant's assertion that his impairment
prevented him from understanding that the victim wanted him to stop
what he was doing.263 The court noted that the victim had resisted the
defendant's
advances for five minutes, telling him "no," "go away," and
2 64
"stop it."

The appellate court concluded that the victim was clear and

unequivocal in declining the defendant's advances, such that there was
no room for any kind of misinterpretation of her wishes.265 The court
effectively ruled that the victim's rejections were clear enough to
penetrate this defendant's cognitive impairment.266
At minimum,
Hopper v. The Queen stands for the proposition that the impairments

fact doctrine, which generally provides that a person is excused from criminal
responsibility for an act if it is completed under an honest and reasonable but mistaken
belief that other facts are in existence, and if that belief were correct, the conduct would
not be criminal. The doctrine holds that an actor is held no more culpable for the
criminal conduct completed under this mistaken view than if the facts actually were as
the actor believed them to be.
258. See State v. Burr, 921 A.2d 1135, 1143 (N.J. Super. 2007).
259. Id. at 1142-43.
260. Id. at 1146-47.

261. Id. at 1143.
262. See Hopper v. The Queen, 2003 WL 21694438,
App. July 18, 2003).

263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. TT 16, 17, 55.
Id.
Id.
155.
Id. TT 54, 55.

40, 54, 55 (Austl. Ct. Crim.
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attributable to AS cannot shield a defendant from mistaking clear,
unequivocal and repeated commands to stop.
Conversely, the court in R v. TS held that evidence showing the
defendant suffered from AS would have helped the jury understand why
the defendant acted under an honest and reasonable belief in what he
believed the situation to be, even if the facts were otherwise.2 67 Like the
defendant in Hopper v. The Queen, the defendant in R v. TS was
allegedly told to stop what he was doing.2 68 The defendant consistently
maintained that the encounter was consensual. 269 However, in R v. TS,
the appellate court found the situation sufficiently vague enough that AS
could compromise the defendant's ability to adequately understand the
intention of the victim. 270

At maximum, R v. TS stands for the

proposition that AS can operate to justify a mistake in fact defense when
the intention of the parties is unclear.
3.

Reduced Responsibility Resulting in Mitigation of Sentence

Some courts have considered the impairments associated with AS to
be mitigating factors at sentencing. English courts have embraced this
trend- AS defendants commonly have their sentences reduced on
appeal.271 In contrast, United States courts rarely reduce sentences based
on impairments associated with AS. 272
In R v. Heather, the trial judge recognized that the defendant was
less culpable for his actions as a result of the narrow interest fixation and
lack of foresight, impairments associated with AS. Interestingly, the trial
judge seemed to leave the door open for the appellate court to quash and
modify the sentence in the event that appropriate living arrangements and
care could be arranged for the defendant. 273

267. See R v. TS, 2008 WL 168748, 34 (2008) (Eng. Crim Jan. 23, 2008).
268. Id.
6, 7, 17. There was conflicting evidence as to whether the victim had
consented to the intimacy. The victim claims to have told the defendant, "[t]here's no
point, you're not going to have sex with me. Don't even try because it's not going to
happen." Id.
269. Id. 33.
270. Id. 34.
271. See cases cited supra note 133.
272. See, e.g., United States v. Kamen, 491 F.Supp.2d 142 (D. Mass. 2007)
(considering AS diagnosis in decision to vacate original guilty verdict of knowing receipt
of child pornography and substitute lesser included sentence of receipt of child
pornography); Martlett v. State, 2007 WL 4555274 (Ind. App. Dec. 28, 2007) (factoring
AS into decision to reduce prison sentence from seventeen to fifteen years).
273. See R v. Heather, 2000 WL 1421166, 6 (Eng. Crim July 31, 2000). The trial
judge appeared to only grudgingly send Heather to prison; the trial judge wondered
whether the appellate court "might have greater powers than he" to find an alternative
residence for Heather. Id.
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The court in R v. Gibson reduced the sentence partly for a lack of
culpability, but mainly for humanitarian reasons.
First, the court
recognized the actual offense was driven not by a criminal desire but by
an obsession beyond the control of the defendant.274 Second, the court
concluded that the defendant's narrow interest fixation on death,
combined with his other impairments, could effectively push him to
suicide in a prison setting.275
The crimes in both R v. Heather and R v. Gibson involved damage
to property. Mitigation in these cases could be explained due to the fact
that the crimes did not involve personal injury. However, English courts
have considered AS a mitigating factor that can justify reduced sentences
for property crimes and crimes involving harm to individuals.2 76
V.

CONCLUSION

In summary, each nation is experiencing an increase in criminal
defendants with AS. This is no doubt another result traceable to the
global shift away from institutionalization of the mentally disabled.277
More importantly, medical and legal communities are gaining awareness
of the diagnosis. Will this awareness generate an evolution in criminal
law to deal with people who have mindblindness?
The unique facts of each case will have a big impact on the
outcomes, but several things seem to be clear. First, English courts are
more tolerant of AS-based defenses. This could be the result of the way
that forensic psychology and psychiatry are employed in the English
criminal justice system, or it could be the result of the concentration of
researchers in England who are studying Asperger's Syndrome.
Whatever the cause, the English are leading the way in unlocking the
riddle of culpability in the AS offender. For example, in R v. Heather,
the appellate court observed that AS is a developmental disorder, not a
mental illness.2 78 This moves people who have AS outside the scope of
the Mental Health Act of 1983 which provides for treatment of
27 9
individuals who undergo commitment and treatment for mental illness.

If AS is not treatable like mental illness, yet AS offenders are not
morally blameworthy for certain crimes, what is the appropriate
disposition for an AS individual charged with a crime? One answer
274.

SeeR v. Gibson, [2001] EWCA (Crim) 656,

275.

Id. 20.

276.
277.

9 (Eng.).

See cases cited supra note 133.
See JAMES R. P. OGLOFF, ET AL., IDENTIFICATION OF MENTAL DISORDERS IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 9 (2006), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/crc/reports/2006ogloff.pdf.
278. See R v. Heather, 2000 WL 1421166,$4 (Eng. Crim July 31, 2000).
279. Id.
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emerging from the English trend is that an AS diagnosis may be
sufficient to warrant a reduction in sentence when the crime matches the
peculiar traits of the AS defendant.
Second, the defenses of mistake in fact, failure of proof, and
diminished capacity are employed in United States, English and
Australia courts with mixed results. This inconsistency signals the need
for a clear, cohesive approach to the AS individual accused of a criminal
offense. Two solutions may allow criminally accused AS individuals
greater access to justice. One is the responsibility of the criminal justice
system and the other is the responsibility of the global AS community.
A.

ProphylacticMeasuresfor Personswith Mindblindness.

The crimes AS offenders are likely to commit are predictable, but
not preventable at this point. Each AS offender's understanding of the
consequences of their conduct will vary based on the extent of their
socialization. Two possible scenarios could cause an AS individual to
run afoul of criminal law. First, with knowledge or comprehension of
the underlying facts essential to completing a criminal act, they
intentionally do something that they know is wrong. Second, without
knowledge or comprehension of the underlying facts essential to
completing a criminal act, they intentionally do something not knowing
it is wrong. In the first instance, there is no question on the course of
action: prosecute and punish the individual. The second instance is much
more complicated. To separate the culpable AS individuals from the
non-culpable, a two-prong test should be used. Individuals who satisfy
the two prongs of the test would be either exempt from criminal
prosecution or subject to reduced punishment.
The first prong involves screening to detect AS individuals upon
arrest. While in custody, if the offender presents behaviors that satisfy
three of the six Gillberg criteria, that person would qualify for a full AS
screening. If the screening results in an AS diagnosis, the first prong has
been satisfied. The first prong is automatically satisfied if the offender
has been diagnosed with AS prior to arrest. This prong serves a
channeling function by identifying AS individuals accused of crime
within the criminal justice system.
The second prong evaluates the AS offender's knowledge and
comprehension of the consequences of personal conduct. If the AS
offender demonstrates understanding of the basic, common sense facts
(factual knowledge which would be essential to complete the crime) and
the consequences of their conduct, then that individual could be
prosecuted for the charged offense. In this instance, AS would not be
considered a bar to criminal prosecution or an imposition of criminal
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culpability. If the offender cannot demonstrate knowledge of basic
underlying facts and an understanding of the consequences of personal
conduct, then criminal culpability would not attach. Such individuals
would receive the "Mindblindness Exemption, 280 from criminal
prosecution, which would substantially mitigate punishment or eliminate
criminal culpability altogether.
This is a classification function,
designating which AS offenders are subject to reduced punishment.
For example, consider that the defendant in R v. Wood did not know
what a bedsore was or what conditions could create life-threatening
bedsores. 28 1 If the defendant in R v. Wood had no knowledge of a
potential injury and did not understand how his conduct would cause it,
he simply lacked the subjective knowledge required to prevent himself
from acting either recklessly or negligently. Punishing lack of foresight
based on honest ignorance of facts is not an acceptable goal for criminal
law.282
This analysis amounts to a subjective test of a person's
commonsense, "worldly" knowledge. Critics would argue that extending
the Mindblindness Exemption would result in unwarranted acquittals for
AS individuals who intended criminal conduct. AS individuals are
capable of and do commit criminal conduct. Within the group of
children Dr. Asperger studied, he identified a small subgroup that acted
with intentional malice and deliberation.28 3 Dr. Tony Attwood, a leading
AS researcher, postulates that these individuals utilized threats of
violence to gain superiority in social situations in an effort to compensate
for the social alienation they experience do to AS.284 The Mindblindness
Exemption would not be available to these individuals because they have
acted with intentional malice. Critics would also point out that some
people could pass the two-pronged test by feigning the traits of AS.
However, the test would ferret out those who fake AS traits to avoid
prosecution; it requires both a legitimate AS diagnosis and a
demonstrated lack of underlying facts and comprehension. In addition,
AS individuals' eagerness to please and inability to read what the tester
is truly trying to measure would likely expose any ruse.
The lack of objective "worldly" factual knowledge, combined with
mindblindness, results in conduct that would be immoral to punish as
criminal. Society and criminal justice do not benefit by punishing
individuals who are truly without blame. The challenge for the AS
280. The "Mindblindness Exemption," used as a term to denote immunity from
criminal prosecution, was coined by the author on January 21, 2008.
281. See R v. Wood, (2004) 149 A. Crim. R. 38,46 (Austl.).
282. See VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 251 (Oxford Univ. Press 2005).
283. Id. at 335.
284. Id.
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individual is twofold. First, they must try to get along in social situations
in an intuitive vacuum, 285 and second, to know enough of "the facts of
life" to keep from unintentionally hurting others or their property. AS
sufferers carry a higher burden to carry than the average citizen, because
the average citizen is assumed to know those two things AS individuals
often do not understand. Therefore, it is necessary to protect AS
individuals from unjust criminal prosecutions. The Mindblindness
Exemption would properly identify AS offenders who do not possess the
mens rea necessary to assess criminal culpability.
B.

Early Intervention

Dr. Asperger studied children instead of adults. The identification
of diagnostic criteria for adults is a recent development.2 86 AS is not a
mental illness; it is a developmental disorder.287 That means that
treatment takes the form of instruction and life skills coaching from an
early age.288 If a child with AS is not properly diagnosed and coached
through childhood and adolescence, the impairment of AS on adult
functioning will be more pronounced.289
Dennis Debbault is a former police officer who has been
researching the interactions of offenders with autistic spectrum disorders
and the criminal justice system since 1991.290 It is his experience that
most offenders do not know they have AS until after they have been
arrested and charged with an offense. Thus, the diagnosis comes later.29'
Further complicating the issue is the relatively low public understanding

285. See ATTWOOD, supra note 1, at 91.
286. See Simon Baron-Cohen, et al., The Adult Asperger Assessment (AAA): A
Diagnostic Method, 35 J. OF AUTISM AND DEV. DISORDERS 807, 808-09 (2005).
Diagnostic criteria for evaluating Asperger's Syndrome in adults was not available before
2005.
287. See, e.g., WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL STATISTICAL
CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES AND RELATED HEALTH PROBLEMS (10th ed. ICD-10)
(2006); AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (text revision 2000) (DSM-IV-TR).
288. See ATTWOOD, supra note 1, at 91-92.
289. See id.
290. Telephone Interview with Dennis Debbault (Jan. 21, 2008). Debbault is the
author of AUTISM, ADVOCATES AND LAW ENFORCEMENT PROFESSIONALS: RECOGNIZING
AND REDUCING RISK SITUATIONS FOR PEOPLE WITH AUTISM SPECTRUM DISORDERS (Jessica

Kingsley Publishers 2002) and AVOIDING UNFORTUNATE SITUATIONS: A COLLECTION OF
EXPERIENCES, TIPS AND INFORMATION FROM AND ABOUT PEOPLE WITH AUTISM AND OTHER
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES AND THEIR ENCOUNTERS WITH LAW ENFORCEMENT

AGENCIES (Way/SAC 1994). Debbault's website provides advice for the AS community
to better cope with law enforcement officials. See Avoiding Unfortunate Situations
http://policeandautism.cjb.net (last visited Feb. 14, 2009).
291. Id.
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of AS.292 Once the AS offender has been diagnosed, "society wants to

know why [they have AS] and who gave them the diagnosis. 2 93
Debbault's website encourages parents and families of people with AS to
prepare for potential encounters with law enforcement.294
It is
Debbault's belief that the AS community must demonstrate its
willingness to be proactive in educating and guiding AS individuals in
order for society to make exceptions for the AS community.295
In the words of Dennis Debbault, "if it is not possible for these
people to learn, everything I am doing is for nothing. 29 6 This statement
applies equally to criminal law. Mens rea theory continues to evolve
over time. Criminal law must learn to accommodate AS offenders and
punish only those who satisfy the mens rea element required to assess
criminal culpability.

292. Id.
293. Id.
294. See Dennis Debbault, Police and Autism: Avoiding Unfortunate Situations,
http://policeandautism.cjb.net (follow "B. Avoiding Unfortunate Situations" hyperlink)
(last visited Feb. 14, 2009).
295. Telephone interview with Dennis Debbault (Jan. 21, 2008).
296. Id.

